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Empathy, the ability to understand and share another person’s 
inner life, is an essential process in social cognition. It is a complex 
form of psychological inference, in which observation, memory, 
knowledge, and reasoning as well as affective sharing are com-
bined (Ickes, 1997). Empathy describes both, sharing as well as 
understanding the emotional state of others in relation to oneself 
(Decety et al., 2008). Thus, previous research focused on two main 
approaches to empathy:
(1) The ability to understand the intentions of another person, so-
called cognitive empathy (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004; 
Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2008), sometimes also termed perspective-
taking (Lamm et al., 2007), “Theory of Mind” (ToM; Wimmer 
and Perner, 1983), or mentalizing (Frith and Frith, 2006a, 2006b).
(2) In contrast, affective empathy focuses on the affective response 
to another person’s presumed affective state (Eisenberg and 
Miller, 1987) and is sometimes also called affective sharing 
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process stories eliciting empathy in either stimulus modality toward a greater involvement of 
anterior frontal brain regions. Our results indicate that children’s processing of stories eliciting 
affective and cognitive empathy is associated with medial and bilateral orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) 
activation. In contrast to what is known from studies using adult participants, no additional 
recruitment of posterior brain regions was observed, often associated with the processing of 
stories eliciting empathy. Developmental changes were found only for stories eliciting affective 
empathy with increased activation, in older children, in medial OFC, left inferior frontal gyrus, 
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with non-verbal presentation of the stimuli having a greater impact on empathy processing in 
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doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00080(Decety and Jackson, 2006). Although empathy and affective 
empathy are sometimes used synonymously in literature, we 
will use the term “affective empathy” in the following to distin-
guish it from “cognitive empathy.”
Cognitive empathy is defined as the ability to imagine or 
“experience” a situation from another person’s point of view. 
At  the  age  of  two,  typically  developing  children  understand 
another  person’s  intentions,  independently  from  their  own 
intentions (Leslie, 1987; Flavell, 1999). Understanding another 
person’s beliefs, for example that a person is thinking wrongly 
about something, develops at the age of about four (see Wellman 
et al., 2001, for an overview). Children between two and a half 
and almost 4 years make the so-called “false belief”-mistake 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). They are unaware of the fact that 
their knowledge is different from another person’s knowledge and 
do not yet understand that different people, depending on their 
perspective, can have different thoughts about the same situation 
(“first-order false belief”). With the age of four, most children 
solve the “false belief” task successfully and 5- to 6-year-olds are 
able to give correct answers in 90% of the cases (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 1985; Perner et al., 1987), and solve even higher-order 
abstraction tasks (Perner and Wimmer, 1985).
Affective empathy is defined as an affective response, derived 
from the apprehension and comprehension of another person’s 
affective state, which is identical or very similar to what the other 
person is expected to feel (Eisenberg, 2000). To empathize with 
another person does not only mean understanding why the other 
person is happy or sad, but also being able to feel with her or him, 
i.e., to mentally “simulate” the other person’s feelings. Affective 
empathy develops very early in life, and the mechanism underlying 
affective sharing is discussed to be present from birth on (Decety 
and Meyer, 2008). The earliest form of empathy is “reactive crying” 
(emotional contagion) in newborns, presumably lacking any cogni-
tive component. Hamlin et al. (2007) suggested that already at about 
6 months of age infants engage in rudimentary forms of social 
evaluation and preferentially interact with an agent who helped 
rather than hindered the actions of another character. Altruistic 
helping as a form of pro-social behavior also emerges early in child-
hood. Behavioral studies demonstrate that by 12 months of age 
infants begin to comfort victims of distress, and 14- to 18-month-
old infants exhibit spontaneous, unrewarded instrumental helping 
behaviors (Warneken and Tomasello, 2009). These naturally emerg-
ing behaviors are thought to be motivated by sympathetic emotion 
or concern for others’ well-being. Affective empathy develops and is 
at its highest level when a person is able to empathize with another 
person’s experiences and feelings beyond the immediate situation 
(Hoffman, 2000).
At present, an important argument for distinguishing the two 
different approaches are the different roles affective and cogni-
tive empathy play in psychiatric disorders like autism and psy-
chopathy: While patients with autism spectrum disorder often 
show impairment in ToM (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), affective 
empathy may be preserved (Blair, 2005; Dziobek et al., 2008). In 
contrast, psychopaths show a great lack of affective, but mostly no 
impairment in cognitive empathy (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; 
Soderstrom, 2003). These findings support the assumption that 
the two concepts, besides sharing similar features and common 
neural networks, may have specific neuronal correlates, distinct 
from each other.
Most imaging studies on cognitive empathy have examined 
mentalizing-tasks that did not include any affective component 
(Decety and Jackson, 2004). Only few studies have been carried 
out linking the two components by directly contrasting cognitive 
and affective empathy tasks in adults (e.g., Hynes et al., 2006; Völlm 
et al., 2006; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2008), while studies in children 
are lacking. The relationship of affective and cognitive empathy has 
yet to be further determined, especially referring to their neuronal 
correlates in children.
A neural network often described in empathy research is the 
frontal mirror neuron system (MNS), including the pars opercularis 
of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG; e.g., Singer, 2006; Pfeifer et al., 
2008; Hooker et al., 2009). The main function associated with the 
MNS is that of a simulation mechanism: Perceiving the actions of 
another person elicits activity in neurons that are also active when 
we perform those actions ourselves (Gallese and Goldman, 1998), 
which makes it a suitable mechanism underlying both, affective 
and cognitive empathic processes (Völlm et al., 2006).
Based on studies on autism and psychopathy, some researchers 
still argue for a dissociation and define empathy as a general term for 
a collection of specific neurocognitive functions (Blair, 2005, 2008). 
The temporoparietal junction (Frith and Frith, 2006a; Decety and 
Lamm, 2007; Decety et al., 2008; Hooker et al., 2009), for example, 
is discussed to only support the processing of cognitive empathy 
and according to a recent meta-analysis on the neural correlates of 
cognitive empathy (Carrington and Bailey, 2009), OFC, temporopa-
rietal junction and the superior temporal sulcus (Hein and Singer, 
2008) are commonly found to be activated by cognitive empathy 
tasks. Somewhat surprisingly, the same study could not identify a 
single region that was consistently activated across all analyzed stud-
ies (Carrington and Bailey, 2009). This could partly be due to the 
diversity of the paradigms, but is also evidence for the complexity of 
social cognition. Moreover, orbitofrontal regions have been found 
active in both, affective (Hynes et al., 2006; Decety and Meyer, 2008; 
Decety et al., 2008) and cognitive empathy tasks (Carrington and 
Bailey, 2009). OFC functioning is known to be critical for social 
cognition processes, moral decisions, and emotion control.
In the present study we investigate the contribution of the OFC 
to empathic processing, both, affective and cognitive, in young 
children.
There is a great lack of developmental studies on empathy and 
a need for investigating the different levels of empathic respond-
ing in further detail, in particular with respect to their underlying 
neural networks. A neurodevelopmental approach on cognitive 
and affective empathy may therefore help to better dissociate the 
two mechanisms (Singer, 2006). A recent functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI) study examined the neural correlates of ToM 
judgments in 8- to 12-year-old children and in adults, using verbal 
and non-verbal cartoons. The results suggest that children and 
adults both activate the temporoparietal junction and the IFG for 
ToM judgments, but differ in their activation patterns depending 
on task modality, e.g., children have higher activation in left IFG 
when processing non-verbal cartoons, whereas adults show higher 
activation in left IFG when processing verbal stimuli. Kobayashi 
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modalities, a non-verbal set of cartoon stories and a set of verbal, audi-
torily presented stories. The aim was to control for modality-specific 
effects which allows us to identify modality-independent and -specific 
activations. Thus, we expected that brain regions that are activated in 
a modality-independent manner, like the posterior temporal regions 
reported by Kobayashi et al. (2007) for visual processing of ToM judg-
ments, could also be identified across a visual and an auditory record-
ing session related either to affective or cognitive empathy. Finding 
brain regions that are activated under both empathy conditions and 
across the different sensory channels would argue for a more general, 
supervisory role of these regions in empathy.
As most studies investigated adults, we had to derive our hypoth-
eses mainly from those results, tentatively assuming analogous 
processing in children. The OFC supports affective as well as cog-
nitive empathy, thus we expect specific activations in this region in 
both conditions. Hynes et al. (2006) already investigated the adult 
OFC’s role in affective versus cognitive perspective-taking by means 
of fMRI. They observed neural activations in both conditions in 
bilateral OFC, but far more for the emotional than for the cognitive 
condition, especially concerning the medial OFC. Thus, we expect 
to observe neural activations for cognitive empathy in lateral and 
for affective empathy in medial OFC.
According to ToM developmental research, older children have 
developed higher empathy skills and should thus show different 
activation-patterns than younger subjects. As affective empathy 
starts to develop very early but seems to change in quality with 
cognitive development, one would expect age-related differences 
in both, affective and cognitive empathy responses. In particular, 
Decety and colleagues (Decety and Michalska; 2010; Decety, 2011) 
hypothesize that a higher involvement of executive functioning 
in empathy processing develops (relatively slowly) in parallel to 
brain maturation, pointing to a role of frontal regions in modulat-
ing empathetic responses (see also Hoffman, 2000). Focusing on a 
relatively young sample of participants provides the opportunity 
to investigate developmental differences in children’s empathy after 
the age of four, when basic abilities are present but still develop 
further. Still, because of sparse experimental results, we are reluctant 
to hypothesize on age differences in more detail.
MaterIals and Methods
saMple
Forty-eight participants (22 male/26 female) aged between 4;0 and 
8;8 (mean age 6;2) were recruited from daycare centers and pri-
mary schools in Berlin. To examine developmental changes, two 
age groups were formed relative to the age of 6;6. Because in the 
German educational system children start attending primary school 
at the age of 6, and one can assume that formal education has an 
important impact on social and cognitive development, the younger 
group mainly consisted of preschool children aged 4;0–6;6 (N = 24; 
mean age = 5;0) and the older group consisted of school children 
aged 6;6 and older (N = 24; mean age = 7;6).
All participants were native German speakers, never had inju-
ries or operations on the brain, were not taking any medication 
and did not show behavioral or neurological conspicuities. Their 
parents received an information-brochure and obtained 20 Euros 
for participation. Both, children and parents were informed about 
et al. (2007) suggest that children adopt different strategies, and 
that the observed interactions with age may be linked to age-related 
refinement of the inferior frontal and posterior temporal regions. A 
further study by Pfeifer et al. (2008) focused on the role of simula-
tion in affective empathy in 10-year-old children. Their findings 
show that activity in the posterior IFG (pars opercularis) correlated 
significantly and positively with empathy and social skills.
The present study examines the processing of affective and 
cognitive empathy in children between 4 and 8 years of age in a 
passive empathy recognition paradigm. Most studies on empathy 
have examined adults and those studies that investigated empathy 
processing in children examined samples aged seven (Decety et al., 
2008; Decety and Michalska, 2010) and older (Kobayashi et al., 
2007; Pfeifer et al., 2008). Morphometric studies have demonstrated 
that structural brain changes in gray and white matter are present 
at preschool age (Giedd et al., 1999). Similarly, the first and main 
developmental steps of cognitive empathy are completed about the 
age of four and affective empathy and forms of pro-social behavior 
are present from early childhood on.
Empathy development and its neural correlates in preschool 
children are poorly understood. Therefore, the age range exam-
ined in the current study includes preschoolers as well as young 
school children. One reason for the lack of developmental studies 
on neural correlates of affective and cognitive empathy is that fMRI 
studies with children are relatively rare. It is still a challenge to per-
form experiments with small children in the noisy and unfamiliar 
environment of an fMRI scanner. Another problem is the high level 
of motion artifacts, occurring during the measurement of young 
children (Karmiloff-Smith, 2010).
To measure the neural correlates of empathy processing in chil-
dren, we used functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS). This 
is a non-invasive, functional optical imaging method, assessing 
changes in cortical oxygenation by applying near-infrared light to 
measure changes in tissue attenuation. It monitors the brain func-
tion by measuring changes in the concentrations of oxygenated 
[oxy-Hb] and deoxygenated hemoglobin [deoxy-Hb] and is based 
on the fact that hemoglobin changes its color when the oxygen con-
tent changes (Obrig and Villringer, 2003; Hofmann et al., 2008). In 
particular, brain activation is indicated by an increase in [oxy-Hb] 
and a decrease in [deoxy-Hb], and it is shown that the latter is highly 
correlated with an increase in fMRI blood oxygen level dependent 
(BOLD) response (Steinbrink et al., 2006). Near-infrared light is 
emitted into the cortex by light-sources and the re-emitted light 
is collected by another set of optic probes (so-called detectors) 
at a distance of 3 cm, making it possible to detect activated brain 
regions, which are approximately 1.5 cm under the cranium. NIRS 
is a high-potential tool in developmental research due to high light 
penetration depth in children’s brains. fNIRS lowers the sensitivity 
to motional artifacts and is a less stressful procedure than fMRI 
(Lloyd-Fox et al., 2010).
There are no studies on empathy using fNIRS so far and generally 
imaging studies on empathy in children are rare. Therefore, a first aim 
of this study is to introduce fNIRS to the field of neurodevelopmen-
tal research on empathy processing. Functional brain responses in 
orbitofrontal and posterior temporal brain regions are investigated 
under affective and cognitive empathy conditions to reveal   similarities 
and differences in the underlying cortical networks. Furthermore, 
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nificant main effect of affective empathy ratings [F(3,44) = 25.206, 
p  <  0.001].  Pairwise  post  hoc  comparisons  using  Scheffé’s  test 
revealed that the affective empathy cartoons (M = 3.81) differed 
from all other cartoon conditions (cognitive empathy: M = 2.60; 
neutral stories with one character: M = 2.47; neutral stories with 
two  characters:  M  =  1.97).  Similarly,  an ANOVA  for  the  ver-
bal listening stories revealed a main effect of affective empathy 
[F(3,44) = 34.917, p < 0.001], again driven by higher ratings for 
affective empathy stories (M = 3.78) as compared to cognitive 
empathy (M = 2.00), neutral with one character (M = 2.01), and 
neutral with two characters (M = 1.86). The length of the spoken 
sentences and the average number of words of the verbal stories 
were balanced across conditions (mean number of words: 37.3, 
range 21–50; mean length: 11.64 s).
experIMental procedure
The stimuli were presented on a standard 17′ PC screen, which 
was placed 60 cm in front of the participants. The experiment 
started with an instruction to listen to in the verbal session or 
watch the stories carefully in the non-verbal session, respectively, 
followed by an example story introducing each block of one of 
the four experimental conditions. Verbal listening stories were 
presented via earphones. Stimulus presentation and timing in 
both modalities were controlled using OGAMA (version 2.0; 
Voßkühler et al., 2008).
After clicking the mouse, a colored screen appeared in both 
modalities,  and  after  a  second  mouse  click,  an  example  story 
started. Following the example, a question was asked (“Did you 
understand?”). This allowed time for more detailed instructions 
and answering questions. When all questions were answered to 
the satisfaction of the child, clicking the mouse once again started 
the actual setting.
For the non-verbal modality, each trial consisted of four pictures, 
each presented for 1.5 s, so that one cartoon story lasted 6 s. After 
the fourth picture, a fixation cross (+) appeared in the middle of 
the screen for 4 s, and the participants were asked to simply click 
the mouse. This mouse clicking after each story did not have an 
influence on the speed of presentation, but was used to keep the 
children concentrated.
The four blocks (affective, cognitive, neutral with one character, 
and neutral with two characters), each containing 12 stories, were 
presented in random order. Inside of each block the two types of 
stories were presented in equal number and pseudorandomized 
order: an affective empathy block contained six stories with posi-
tive and six stories with negative ending; a cognitive empathy block 
contained six stories with logical and six stories with non-logical 
ending, and in neutral blocks six stories were presented in correct 
and six in scrambled order. Between the blocks a colored screen 
appeared, so that the participants could take a break before con-
tinuing by clicking.
The verbal session worked exactly the same way, except that 
a fixation cross was displayed while the participants listened to 
the four sentences. The average length of one sentence was 2.9 s. 
The two runs (two modalities) were presented one after the other, 
with a short break in between. Half of the subjects started with the 
cartoons, the other half with the listening stories.
the background of the study and its procedure and gave their 
agreement. Parents attended the whole session and could observe 
it via video from a second laboratory room. The recruitment and 
experimental procedure was performed in accordance with the local 
ethical guidelines and consent and assent were obtained from the 
parent(s) or legal guardian(s) and the child.
A short form of the Kaufman assessment battery for children 
(K-ABC; Kaufman and Applegate, 1988) was used to make sure 
none  of  the  participants  had  an  estimated  IQ  lower  than  85, 
which is 1 SD below the mean. The mean score was 109.38 (range: 
85–134.10, SD = 11.90) for the mental processing composite (MPC) 
and 111.42 (range: 88.40–132.35, SD = 8.45) for the Achievement 
Scales (ACH). The two age groups did not differ significantly 
in K-ABC scores (young children: mean MPC score = 107.52, 
SD = 12.34; mean ACH score = 113.38, SD = 8.78; older children: 
mean MPC score = 111.23, SD = 11.40; mean ACH score = 111.42, 
SD = 8.45), as proven by a t-test [MPC: t(46) = −1.038, p = 0.285; 
ACH: T(46) = 1.631, p = 0.110].
MaterIal
The material consisted of two sets of stimuli, a visual set of non-
verbal cartoon stories and an auditory set of verbal listening stories. 
Every cartoon consisted of four pictures and every story consisted of 
four sentences, which were presented in a fixed order (see Figure 2). 
Four conditions were presented during the study:
1. Affective empathy (two characters)
2. Cognitive empathy (one character)
3. Neutral stories with one character
4. Neutral stories with two characters
The material is based on a study by Völlm et al. (2006). A profes-
sional illustrator was engaged to adapt these cartoons for the cur-
rent study. Additionally, new stories were developed. The cartoon 
stories were drawn in black and white. Only the main character 
was wearing something colored to direct the attention to her or 
him (see Figures 1A–D, see also Appendix).
The verbal listening stories were derived from the cartoon sto-
ries by describing each picture by one sentence (Figure 1E). These 
stories were then read in by an actress. In analogy to Völlm et al. 
(2006), all stories were constructed in two versions, which differed 
only in the last picture/sentence. The affective empathy stories had 
either a positive ending or a negative one. The cognitive empathy 
stories ended logically or illogically (i.e., the behavior of the main 
character was reasonable or not). All neutral stories relied on the 
understanding of physical causalities and were shown in correct or 
scrambled order, the fourth picture being necessary to recognize 
the difference. Every story was only seen and heard in one version 
by each subject.
The final material was derived from a larger set of stories by 
means of a rating study. Sixteen to 24 adults rated all cartoon stories 
online, evaluating how strongly the course of the story elicits affec-
tive empathy on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strongly), to 
control for the affective empathy elicited by these stories.
The final stimulus set consisted of 48 stories in each stimulus 
modality, 12 of each experimental condition, half of them posi-
tive, logical, or in correct order and half negative, not logical, or 
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a German version of the “Griffith empathy measure (GEM)” 
scale (Dadds et al., 2008), a brief parent-report measure of child 
empathy. Overall, the children varied widely in their resulting 
empathy scores with a GEM total of 15.54 (SD = 18.24). For the 
affective empathy sub-scale, the mean score was 3.56 (SD = 7.24), 
for the cognitive empathy sub-scale it was 3.91 (SD = 9.14). A 
Every cartoon story took 6 s plus break, thus every block took 
2 min (8 min for all four blocks) plus breaks and examples for the 
visual trials; the auditory blocks took 3.13 min on average each, 
12.51 min altogether plus breaks and examples.
Throughout  the  whole  measuring  procedure,  a  supervisor 
stayed in the room, read instructions to the children and answered 
questions.
FIguRe 1 | (A) Example of a cartoon stimulus from the negative affective 
empathy condition. (B) Example of a cartoon stimulus from the positive affective 
empathy condition. (C) Example of a cartoon stimulus from the logical cognitive 
empathy condition. (D) Example of a cartoon stimulus from the non-logical 
cognitive empathy condition. (e) Examples of auditory stimuli: negative affective 
and logical cognitive story, in German and English.
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1.7917 mM−1cm−1, deoxy-Hb 3.8437 mM−1cm−1 (using data from: 
W. B. Gratzer, Med. Res. Council Labs, Holly Hill, London), and 
a photon differential path-length factor of 5.98 cm for 830 nm 
and 7.15 for 760 nm. The obtained time series of [oxy-Hb] 
and [deoxy-Hb] concentration changes were low-pass filtered 
with a cut-off frequency of 0.4 Hz and visually inspected to 
correct for artifacts related to the subjects’ motion. The trial 
was excluded from further analysis, if simultaneous step-like 
changes were observed for both, [oxy-Hb] and [deoxy-Hb], in 
at least two neighboring channels. Due to this procedure 21.03% 
(24.67/16.57% in younger/older group) of all data in the visual 
and 21.19% (21.57/20.78% in younger/older group) in the audi-
tory condition were discarded.
The experimental time courses were block-averaged over six 
repetitions of every condition in the interval between −10 and +20 s 
around the stimulus onset of the last sentence (to cover the length 
of the hemodynamic responses to each presented story as a whole) 
and detrended to correct for linear baseline drift.
General linear modeling
Preprocessed data were subjected to a general linear model (GLM) 
analysis. Each of the four conditions – cognitive empathy, affective 
empathy, neutral story with one character, neutral story with two 
characters – was modeled with two predictors: The first predictor 
of each condition modeled cerebral activation at the onsets of the 
first three sentences/pictures of the story, the second predictor of 
each condition modeled the onsets of the last sentence/picture. 
Delta functions of the sentence/picture onsets were convolved with 
a hemodynamic response function (sum of two gamma functions 
with time constants of 5 and 16 s and with weights of 1 and −1/6). 
The predictors were subjected to the same block average procedure 
as the experimental time courses, accounting for blocks dismissed 
due to motion correction. An example of block-averaged data 
together with predictor time course is shown in Figure 4. Since 
each of the four conditions was presented in non-overlapping 
blocks, they were analyzed separately. Contrasts of interest were 
computed from the estimated beta values of the predictor of the last 
comparison of the younger and older children did not reveal 
significant differences [GEM total: T(46) = 0.564, p = 0.575; GEM 
affective T(46) = 0.500, p = 0.620; GEM cognitive: T(46) = 0.413, 
p = 0.681].
nIrs data acquIsItIon
The fNIRS measurements were performed by a DYNOT System 
(32 sources/32 detectors, NIRx Medizintechnik, GmbH, Berlin, 
Germany) operating at two wavelengths (760 and 830 nm) at a 
sampling rate of 4.13 Hz. An optode-set of 11 sources and 21 
detectors was used, making 39 source detector pairs (channels; 
see Figure 3B). The output ends of the sources and the input ends 
of the detector fibers were inserted into the electrode holes of a 
52-cm Easycap (M16, equidistant system; Falk Minow Services), 
which was placed on the participants’ heads. The optodes were 
placed on the orbitofrontal and temporal regions of the head with 
3 cm averaged source detector-distance (equidistant system). 
To capture the orbitofrontal regions, the Easycap was turned by 
180°, so that optodes could be placed on the forehead, positioned 
more orbital than usual. Synchronization with the experimental 
procedures was provided by marker signals (TTL), sent via the 
parallel port of the stimuli presenting computer, using OGAMA 
software.
In order to avoid time-consuming optode positioning proce-
dures, the Easycap was prepared in advance by placing the optodes 
on it. Some sources and detectors had to be optimized by fixing hair 
with a small amount of gel (EASYCAP Supervisc, high-viscosity 
electrolyte-gel) to make sure no hair absorbed the light.
data analysIs
Preprocessing
The  NILAB  toolbox  (Koch  et  al.,  2009)  and  Matlab  (The 
MathWorks)  were  used  for  fNIRS-data  analysis.  The  time 
courses of detected light intensities at both wavelengths were 
transformed into time courses of concentration changes of oxy-
genated [oxy-Hb] and deoxygenated [deoxy-Hb] hemoglobin by 
using the modified Beer Lambert law (Cope and Delpy, 1988). 
We used the following extinction coefficients: 830 nm oxy-Hb 
FIguRe 2 | Design. 
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Neutral (one)]: to directly contrast affective and cognitive 
empathy processing, contrast 1 and 2 are subtracted. As a 
result, activation increases are related to affective empathy 
processing, whereas decreases are related to cognitive empa-
thy processing.
To detect effects of age, paired t-tests comprising “age group” 
as factor were computed. In addition, to identify whether or not 
neural activity in our a priori regions of interest correlated with the 
parent-reported empathy scores, a correlational analysis across all 
subjects was performed between the activity in the three contrasts 
and the affective and cognitive GEM sub-scores. For all analyses, 
significant results are reported that exceed a conservative threshold 
of p < 0.01 (uncorrected).
results
Due to unusually high residual variance in some subjects, data 
for seven cartoon and four listening sessions had to be excluded 
from further analysis. Cartoon (N = 40) and auditory listening 
story (N = 44) data were analyzed separately. Significant changes 
in oxygenated [oxy-Hb] and deoxygenated blood [deoxy-Hb] dur-
ing the trials are given in Table 2 for visual and Table 3 for auditory 
presentation.
sentence/picture and subjected to a second level analysis. Results for 
  non-verbal cartoon stories and verbal stories and for both hemo-
globin species are reported.
Optode locations as a basis for neuroanatomical labeling of the 
NIRS channels were obtained by means of an anatomical MRI tem-
plate. Since the brain volume and geometry changes only slightly 
after the age of two (Faria et al., 2010), we acquired an anatomical 
T1 scan of an adult subject with a head circumference of 52 cm, 
the same circumference our sample had on average, wearing the 
Easycap  (3T,  SIEMENS-Trio,  MPRAGE-Sequence,  resolution 
1 mm × 1 mm × 1 mm). The fiducial markers were placed in all 
optode positions and reference Cz. The anatomical volume was 
normalized to standard Talairach 3D space using BrainVoyager QX 
(v 1.7; Brain Innovation, Maastricht, The Netherlands). The channel-
positions were defined, computing the exact midway between source 
and detector and the most probable anatomical label was obtained 
using the NFRI-toolbox (Okamoto et al., 2004; Singh et al., 2005).
Channels were clustered to define regions of interest, based on 
our initial hypotheses. One cluster comprised the average signal of 
three defining channels (see Figure 3; Table 1). Five clusters were 
defined: medial OFC, left OFC, right OFC, left PTR, and right PTR. 
In addition to this clustered region-of-interest analysis, significant 
activations of single channels which exceed a conservative threshold 
of p < 0.01 are reported, too. The positions of the channels and 
clusters can be seen in Figure 3.
For each stimulus modality one-sample t-tests (two-tailed) were 
computed at the second level for the following three main contrasts:
(1) Affective empathy > Neutral (two characters): subtracting activa-
tions during the processing of neutral stimuli from those during 
processing affective empathy stimuli to reveal hemodynamic 
responses related to affective empathy processing only (Note 
that both conditions contained stories with two characters).
(2) Cognitive empathy > Neutral (one character): subtracting acti-
vations during the processing of neutral stimuli from those 
during processing cognitive empathy stimuli to reveal hemo-
dynamic responses related to cognitive empathy only.
FIguRe 3 | (A) Optode positions on an equidistant 88-channel EEG cap. 
Note that the EEG cap was turned by 180° to place optodes on the forehead 
to be able to record orbitofrontal activation; green: sources, orange: 
detectors; (B) location of the channels superimposed on a equidistant 
88-channel EEG cap together with the approximate location of the selected 
regions of interest.
Table 1 | Cluster definitions.
Cluster  Channels
ORBITOFRONTAl CORTex (OFC) COveRINg BA10, BA11
Medial OFC  Ch1, ch9, ch10
Left OFC  Ch2, ch7, ch8
Right OFC  Ch5, Ch11, Ch12
POSTeRIOR TemPORAl RegION (PTR) INCluDINg SuPeRIOR  
TemPORAl SulCuS AND TemPOROPARIeTAl juNCTION
Left PTR  Ch30, ch31, ch37
Right PTR  Ch33, ch35, ch38
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Cartoons
Significant activations related to cognitive empathy processing were 
elicited in right and left OFC, as well as in channel 16 [oxy-Hb] 
of the left dlPFC. No significant age differences were observed in 
this contrast.
Listening stories
Significant  activations  were  observed  in  left  and  right  OFC. 
Additionally [deoxy-Hb] channel 20 of the right dlPFC showed a 
significant activation. No age-group differences were found.
contrast (3): (affectIve – neutral wIth one 
character) > (cognItIve – neutral wIth two characters)
Cartoons
No region reached the level of significance in the direct contrast. 
No age differences were found.
Listening stories
No region reached the level of significance. A significant effect of age 
group was observed in the medial OFC ([oxy-Hb]; T(42) = −2.925; 
p = 0.006). The effect was due to larger positive concentration 
changes in [oxy-Hb] in the older children’s group in the affective 
empathy condition compared with higher activation of medial OFC 
in the cognitive empathy condition in younger children.
The correlational analysis with the affective and cognitive 
GEM scores revealed significant correlations with the parent-
rated  affective  empathy  measure  only.  Significant  positive 
correlations  were  found  for  the  non-verbal  cartoon-modal-
ity in the medial OFC in contrast (1) ([Affective > Neutral]; 
[deoxy-Hb]; r = 0.409, p = 0.009) as well as in contrast (2) 
([Cognitive > Neutral]; [deoxy-Hb]; r = 0.460; p = 0.003), reveal-
ing activation decreases in children with higher affective GEM 
scores in the medial OFC.
dIscussIon
The present study investigated the neural correlates of affec-
tive and cognitive empathy in young children in orbitofrontal 
and  posterior  temporal  regions. We  measured  hemodynamic 
responses of empathy processing in a non-verbal cartoon and a 
verbal story-listening task using fNIRS and observed activations 
related to empathy processing in medial and bilateral OFC for 
both types of stimuli.
Our results provide evidence for the hypothesis that empathy 
processing in young, healthy children requires a greater involve-
ment of orbitofrontal brain regions, irrespective of whether the 
task elicits affective or cognitive empathy. As such, the present 
study extends recent findings from studies examining adult par-
ticipants that also found orbitofrontal regions involved in empathy 
processing (Hynes et al., 2006; Decety and Meyer, 2008; Decety 
et al., 2008). Thus, although it is discussed that anterior frontal 
regions mature relatively late (until the age of 20, see Giedd et al., 
1999), and maturation itself is suggested to be the reason for the 
late development of complex social cognition skills in ontogeny, 
our results suggest that also young children’s empathic process-
ing depends on orbitofrontal functioning comparable to what is 
known from adult studies.
contrast (1): affectIve > neutral wIth two characters
Cartoons
Significant activations were observed in medial OFC and bilat-
eral OFC. In addition, channels in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(dlPFC) revealed significant activations: channel 15 [deoxy-Hb] 
and 17 [oxy-Hb] of the left and channel 19 [oxy-Hb] of the right 
dlPFC (see Table 2; Figure 5).
The t-test for age-group differences showed a significant age-
effect in channel 17 [oxy-Hb], left dlPFC, demonstrating that older 
children activated this region to a greater degree than younger ones 
[T(38) = −3.737; p = 0.001].
Listening stories
The left OFC was significantly activated for the affective condi-
tion. Age differences were observed in [deoxy-Hb] channel 24 
[T(42) = 3.728; p = 0.001] in the anterior left IFG. Again, older 
children showed higher activations (increased deactivations in 
[deoxy-Hb]) revealing age-related differences in left IFG involve-
ment in affective empathy processing (see Table 3; Figure 6).
Table 2 | Significant findings for non-verbal cartoon stories.
  main effects
  [Oxy-Hb]  [Deoxy-Hb]
  T-value  p-value  T-value  p-value
AFF > NeuTRAl
Medial OFC  3.342  0.002**  0.146  0.884
Left OFC  5.048  0.000**  −3.504  0.001**
Right OFC  4.137  0.000**  −3.069  0.004**
Left dlPFC (channel 15)  0.747  0.472  −3.481  0.001**
Left dlPFC (channel 17)  2.823  0.007**  −1.771  0.084
Right dlPFC (channel 19)  3.007  0.005**  −0.546  0.588
COg > NeuTRAl
Left OFC  2.800  0.008**  −3.937  0.000**
Right OFC  3.029  0.004**  −1.251  0.218
Left dlPFC (channel 16)  3.851  0.000**  −2.198  0.043
Two-tailed t-tests; **p < 0.01.
Table 3 | Significant findings for verbal listening series.
  main effects
  [Oxy-Hb]  [Deoxy-Hb]
  T-value  p-value  T-value  p-value
AFF > NeuTRAl
Left OFC  2.741  0.009**  −1.195  0.239
COg > NeuTRAl
Left OFC  1.386  0.173  −4.035  0.000**
Right OFC  1.313  0.196  −2.952  0.005**
Right dlPFC (channel 20)  0.126  0.827  −2.951  0.005**
Two-tailed t-tests; **p < 0.01
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In line with our initial hypothesis, affective as well as cognitive 
empathy processing activates the OFC bilaterally. The occurrence 
of similar activation patterns for the two conditions is additionally 
supported by the finding that the direct (Affective > Cognitive) 
contrast showed no significant differences.
The role of the OFC has been examined by recent fMRI stud-
ies, investigating either affective (e.g., Decety et al., 2008) or 
cognitive (see Carrington and Bailey, 2009) empathic processing 
in adults, but without contrasting the two conditions directly. 
The neuropsychological lesion literature indicates, too, that the 
critical areas for empathic impairment of empathy processing 
are located in the OFC, as damage to those regions is associ-
ated with deficits in empathy (Eslinger, 1998; Shamay-Tsoory 
et al., 2004).
Only two fMRI studies, both on adults, were conducted that 
were comparable: Völlm et al. (2006) as well as Hynes et al. (2006) 
found OFC activations for both conditions bilaterally. In the latter 
study, affective empathic processing elicited higher activation and 
additionally activated the medial OFC (Hynes et al., 2006). Still, 
these studies differ from the present study in critical aspects and 
therefore their results are not directly comparable to ours: Both 
fMRI studies relied on adult participants, who were asked to make 
explicit empathy judgments, whereas the present study might have 
triggered empathic responses implicitly, more closely related to the 
concept of empathy as “Einfühlen,” defining empathy as a mode of 
inner imitation or “feeling into someone” (Eisenberg and Strayer, 
1987; Barnes and Thagard, 1997).
A direct comparison of the auditory and visual modality has 
so far not been conducted with young participants and it seems 
likely that their empathic processing might differ from that in 
adults. Since no additional activations in temporal regions were 
observed in the present study, differences between children’s and 
adults’ processing of empathic stories seem to be associated with 
differences in the engagement of temporal regions, and not the 
OFC. Still, it should be noted that the present definition of the 
PTR and its approximate location does not fully overlap with the 
often reported TPJ area in adults’ cognitive empathy processing. 
The examined PTR cluster is located in large parts along the 
superior temporal sulcus. The latter has reciprocal connections 
to the OFC (Barbas, 1988) and has been implicated in cognitive 
empathy processing and social cognition (Allison et al., 2000; 
Hein and Singer, 2008). Figure 5 shows that activations in PTR 
occurred in both visual empathy conditions, but did not reach 
our a priori level of significance
1. Whether this trend occurred 
because of a loss in statistical power due to methodological 
issues or whether it indicates principal differences between an 
involvement of the posterior superior temporal sulcus and the 
neighboring TPJ in children’s empathy processing should be 
examined in future longitudinal neuroimaging studies using 
similar paradigms in adults and children that can help solving 
this issue.
The OFC is suggested to be a key region supporting social cog-
nition in general: It was found to be critical for ToM-processing 
(Carrington and Bailey, 2009) and decision making (Kringelbach, 
2005) on the one hand, and moral appraisals (Moll et al., 2002) and 
affective empathy (Decety and Jackson, 2004; Hynes et al., 2006) 
on the other hand. Thus, it is likely that social cognition, including 
empathy, is supported by OFC functioning, independent of how 
affective or cognitive the process might be.
FIguRe 4 | (A) Example time course of the predictors used for GLM-analysis of 
block-averaged fNIRS-data in the interval between −10 to +20 s around onset of 
the fourth picture (sentence) of one subject. Displayed are the delta functions 
and the two predictors that model hemodynamic responses induced by the 
first three or the fourth picture (sentence) of the story presented at t = 0s. (B) 
Example time course of [oxy-Hb] and [deoxy-Hb] concentration changes for left 
OFC for the visual affective empathy condition averaged over all block 
repetitions and over subject population, overlaid with corresponding 
GLM-model. Note that the time courses show a relative deactivation for the 
visual affective empathy condition with decreasing [oxy-Hb] and increasing 
[deoxy-Hb] due to the superposition of the first three and the fourth cartoon 
slides. The relative deactivation of the lateral orbitofrontal regions during 
processing of the stories is in agreement with fMRI results on similar material 
(Hynes et al., 2006, Figure 2). Besides this overall deactivation during the 
processing of the empathy stories, activation was revealed for the respective 
contrasts (see results, Table 2).
1left  PTR  [deoxy-Hb]:  visual  (Affective  >  Neutral)  contrast:  T(39)  =  −1.950; 
p  =  0.058;  left  PTR  [deoxy-Hb]:  visual  (Cognitive  >  Neutral)  contrast: 
T(39) = −2.176; p = 0.036;
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whether the notion of affective empathy in terms of a social cogni-
tion process differs from the notion of affective empathy in terms 
of pain in others (e.g., Decety et al., 2008; Hein and Singer, 2008).
Finally, the diversity of paradigms and materials may account 
for some of the variability in the results of different studies: Written 
scenarios or cartoons (Kobayashi et al., 2007), interpretation of 
facial expression from the eyes (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999), detec-
tion of faux-pas and irony (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005), judgments 
(Völlm et al., 2006), or pain in others (Decety et al., 2008) are 
all paradigms used in empathy research. The present study was 
designed to focus on the direct comparison of equivalent process-
ing of affective versus cognitive empathy, while passively following 
the course of a stimulus story. We think a strength of the present 
study lies in the parallel measurement of a visual non-verbal and an 
auditory verbal condition, which shows a remarkably high degree of 
concordance in the results and thus is able to replicate the OFC find-
ings in each presentation domain. However, across all   conditions, 
The observed involvement of the OFC in empathy processing 
is also in line with theories that propose a hierarchical structure 
of  the  prefrontal  cortex,  postulating  more  complex  cognitive 
processes, the more anterior a region is located in the frontal lobe 
(Fuster, 2004; Botvinick, 2008; Barbey et al., 2009). As a first result, 
thus, complex socio-emotional processing as in the affective and 
cognitive empathy conditions of our study, demanding the mir-
roring of different plots, intentions and emotions, seems to require 
the most anterior part of the brain in young children.
It still remains an open question why other studies on the same 
issue did not find OFC activations for affective and cognitive empathy 
(see Hein and Singer, 2008). There is a lot of variance among activated 
areas within empathy paradigms (Carrington and Bailey, 2009). It is 
also obvious from the heterogeneity in the literature that there are 
several ways of defining and assessing empathy and the relationship 
of its components. For example, “affective ToM,” “affective perspec-
tive-taking,” and ”affective empathy” are often used synonymously, 
but do not always really describe and measure the same process, as 
FIguRe 5 | Activations for the visual condition; [oxy-Hb] and [deoxy-Hb] results across all four main contrasts in the sagittal and a frontal view.
Brink et al.  Affective and cognitive empathy in children
Frontiers in Psychology  | Language Sciences    April 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 80  |  10to be the difference between the two empathy-components. Again, 
it should be noted that medial PFC has not been the focus of the 
present study due to the low sensitivity of fNIRS to signals in these 
deeper brain regions along the medial wall.
We further observed an effect of children’s age in medial OFC, 
related to affective empathy processing: Older children showed 
higher  medial  OFC  activation  for  the  direct  (Affective  empa-
thy > Cognitive empathy) contrast than younger ones. We think 
that this main effect of age indicates a shift toward an involvement 
of additional medial parts of the anterior frontal lobe with older age 
in affective but not in cognitive empathy processing. This finding is 
supported by the neuroimaging literature on adults’ affective empa-
thy processing, who additionally require medial frontal regions 
(Decety and Jackson, 2004; Hynes et al., 2006; Hein and Singer, 
2008). As such, our results show a pattern opposite to that of a 
recent neurodevelopmental study by Decety and Michalska (2010), 
who conducted an fMRI study with participants ranging from 7 
to 40 years of age. Decety and Michalska (2010) report greater 
activation in the OFC in response to affective   empathy-eliciting 
cartoon stories elicited overall higher activations, recruited more 
anterior frontal regions in the OFC, and enhanced activations in 
dorsolateral regions. This points to the hypothesized visual domi-
nance in younger children’s processing (Guttentag, 1985), and a 
higher familiarity and external validity of cartoon-like stories. Thus, 
it seems likely that the visual modality facilitates the processing of 
its content and therefore the processing of empathic contents, too.
Only small differences are visible between affective and cognitive 
empathy processing in the present study and those did not sur-
vive the direct contrasting. fNIRS can only measure hemodynamic 
responses in the outer cortical regions. Thus, it is obvious that this 
method is not able to detect emotion-related differences in subcor-
tical parts of the emotion processing circuits (Dolan, 2002), where 
further specific activations related to affective processing may be 
located. Still, our finding of additional medial OFC involvement, 
specific for affective empathy processing, is in line with the results 
of Hynes et al. (2006) for adults, even if we observed this activation 
for the visual modality only. Hynes et al. (2006) report medial OFC 
and medial PFC activations for affective processing, suggesting this 
FIguRe 6 | Activations for the auditory condition; [oxy-Hb] and [deoxy-Hb] results across all four main contrasts in the sagittal and a frontal view.
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ent shift in affective empathy processing in older compared with 
younger children. Older children’s processing of auditory affective 
empathy stories is associated with higher involvement of the left 
IFG. Thus, children seem to increase the use of the frontal MNS 
more with ongoing development.
A different view comes from semantic memory research. Left 
IFG has been shown to be more active in tasks requiring retrieval of 
semantic knowledge and verbal recoding (Thompson-Schill et al., 
1997; Poldrack et al., 1999). Thus, it is also reasonable to argue 
that younger and older children differ in the amount of verbal 
processing (e.g., rehearsal or recoding) when listening to affective 
empathy stories. As the IFG was only activated for age differences, 
the theory of a developing MNS seems to be a plausible account.
Finally, an age-effect was observed for channel 17 [oxy-Hb], 
showing higher activation in left dlPFC for older children for affec-
tive empathic processing in the visual domain. Apart from a general 
discussion on the role of dlPFC in working memory and executive 
functions (Miller and Cohen, 2001; Fuster, 2004; Petrides, 2005), 
an involvement of dlPFC in empathy processing has previously 
been reported in a lesion study (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2003; also 
see Shamay-Tsoory and Aharon-Peretz, 2007). Patients with dlPFC 
lesions, as well as patients with ventro-medial PFC lesions, showed 
higher deficits in different ToM tasks, as compared to healthy con-
trol participants. Still, these authors also showed that empathy per-
formance in the dlPFC group correlates with cognitive flexibility 
measures, again pointing more toward a role of dlPFC in executive 
functioning as a basis for empathy processing.
Taken together, the age-effects observed in the present study are 
all related to affective empathy processing, thus indicating devel-
opmental changes in the affective empathy component in the age-
group investigated. Future research might use the same design in 
a study on adults to further our knowledge of developmental dif-
ferences between children and adults.
addItIonal fIndIngs
Apart from the finding of medial OFC involvement, no specific 
activations were found for the affective versus cognitive empathy 
comparisons. Also, no PTR cluster and no other channel in the 
temporal lobe became significantly activated. Temporal regions 
are discussed to be specifically activated for cognitive empathic 
processing in adults (Frith and Frith, 2006a). As Carrington and 
Bailey (2009) meta-analyzed, many different studies on ToM found 
different regions, but no single region to be activated concordantly. 
Only few other functional imaging studies on children’s empathic 
processing (Kobayashi et al., 2007; Pfeifer et al., 2008; Decety and 
Michalska, 2010, age seven and above) reported a TPJ activation. 
In this study, school children processed ToM stories and were asked 
to judge false beliefs (Kobayashi et al., 2007). Thus, it is likely that 
passive following of empathic stories in young children, as in the 
present study, does not recruit additional neural circuits in anterior 
and posterior temporal regions. Empathic processing in this age 
range may be restricted to the most anterior parts of the brain.
For  the  visual  modality,  correlations  of  the  affective  GEM 
scores with medial OFC activation were found, revealing a nega-
tive correlation with affective and cognitive empathic processing, 
whereas cognitive GEM scores did not correlate significantly with 
scenarios (depicting intentional harm) that was shifted from its 
medial portion in younger participants, to the lateral portion in 
older participants. The authors discuss this pattern of developmen-
tal change in the OFC as reflecting a gradual shift from the monitor-
ing of somatovisceral responses in young children to the executive 
control of emotion processing in older participants. Interestingly, 
Decety and Michalska (2010) report also age-related correlations 
in lateral frontal regions (enhanced involvement with older age) 
which seem to be more consistent with age-related findings in left 
dlPFC and IFG for the affective empathy condition.
Because Decety and Michalska (2010) investigated a much larger 
age range (with only a small amount of children at the age of our sam-
ple) and focused on somatovisceral empathic processing, whereas 
our study examined affective empathy processing in everyday social 
contexts, these two studies are not directly comparable. Still, we see 
the increased activation in medial OFC in older children as evidence 
in support of the hypothesis of an ongoing development of affective 
empathy processing in children aged between 4 and 8 years, with 
a further specialization of medial OFC in social-  cognitive affective 
empathy processing in the older children. Whereas the younger age 
group shows no differential activation in medial OFC between the 
affective and cognitive condition, older children have a higher activa-
tion in medial OFC during affective empathy processing compared 
than during cognitive empathy processing
2.
Still, one might wonder why this age-effect was only found in the 
auditory condition. This finding suggests that visual and auditory 
processing of empathy stories in young children are qualitatively 
different due to their different everyday familiarity. We suggest this 
to result from a visual processing dominance in children. Children 
are probably more used to following visually guided cartoon sto-
ries than to listening mindfully to auditory empathy stories (e.g., 
Hayes and Birnbaum, 1980). Moreover, one could suppose that 
visual empathic processing along the OFC is developed earlier in 
ontogeny than the development of auditory empathic processing. 
For example, when children’s auditory and visual perception of 
video-clips was tested, the results provide evidence that children, 
especially preschoolers, payed more attention to and recognized 
more details in visual than in auditory information (Grieve and 
Williamson, 1977; Hayes and Birnbaum, 1980). This is supported 
by the pattern of results for the visual condition which in general 
more closely mirrors the results obtained in studies with adults. 
The observed medial OFC activation in the visual affective empathy 
condition across the whole sample may result from facilitated and 
further-developed processing in the visual domain. Accordingly, it 
seems possible that it is easier to detect developmental changes in 
the auditory domain. Still, the adult fMRI studies relied on visual 
processing, and processing of empathy has not been investigated 
with auditory stimuli yet.
A second developmental effect was visible in affective empa-
thy processing of auditory stimuli in the left IFG. As mentioned 
above, involvement of left IFG is often reported in adult studies 
on   empathy processing and the MNS. These differences in the 
2To  further  evaluate  the  age-related  effect  in  [oxy-Hb]  in  contrast  3  (Affecti-
ve empathy > Cognitive empathy) post hoc simple t-test were computed for each 
age-group separately. In young children, no significant contrast effect was visible 
[T(22) = −1.750; p = 0.094], whereas older children showed a significant higher 
activation in affective empathy processing [T(20) = 2.609; p = 0.017].
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does not allow to conclude that all children processed all stories 
deeply and with an intention to take the point of view of the main 
character which might have led to less activations in empathy 
processing regions. Secondly, one might ask whether the adult 
ratings to the empathy stories are also valid for children. Children’s 
ratings are not yet available for the stimulus set and it is question-
able to what extend young children are able to explicitly judge their 
empathic involvement – which is the reason why we had to base 
the study on adult rating data. Therefore, we cannot be certain, 
for example, whether the children processed all empathy stories 
in an affective manner or not. Still, given the post-experimental 
interviews, we believe, that the children processed the stories in 
the intended manner, and the high concordance of the results with 
that of previous adult studies seems to validate this assumption. 
Further studies are needed which directly address the differences 
between passively following and explicitly judging of empathy 
stories in young children.
conclusIon
Taken together, our findings provide evidence for higher medial and 
bilateral OFC activation in both, affective and cognitive empathy 
processing in a sample of young children 4–8 years of age. Thus, in 
a manner similar to what is known from adult OFC recruitment in 
complex social cognition tasks and empathy processing, orbitof-
rontal regions were involved in a task in which children passively 
followed empathic narratives – independently of whether these 
stories presented social situations where a character experiences 
affective outcomes of its own action or the plot required the men-
talizing and prediction of further actions, and independently of 
whether these stories were presented visually or auditorily. Hence, 
our results support the idea that the OFC is a brain region associ-
ated with computing and evaluating predictions of other persons’ 
actions and the comparison of these predictions with subjective 
states across both affective and non-affective situations.
Furthermore, in contrast to our initial hypotheses, developmen-
tal changes with increased brain activation in older children were 
observed in affective empathy processing as compared to neutral 
stories in left dlPFC in the visual condition and left anterior IFG in 
the auditory condition, but no age-related effects were observed in 
cognitive empathy processing. In contrast, medial OFC showed a 
higher activation when directly contrasting affective and cognitive 
processing conditions. Thus, the results support the idea of medial 
OFC being especially engaged in socio-affective processing and a 
development of medial OFC functioning toward a higher involve-
ment with older ages during childhood.
any activated brain region in the present study. These results lead 
to the question to what extent children who score high in affective 
GEM activate the medial OFC less for affective and for cognitive 
empathic processing.
As parent-rated GEM scores and age did not correlate in the 
present study, this effect cannot simply be attributed to age. The 
finding suggests that children who are more affectively empathic 
process affective and cognitive empathy stories differently in the 
medial OFC (whose activation was only found to be related with 
affective empathic processing). Although the particular correlations 
are negative, this result mirrors well the above findings which point 
to the close relationship between medial OFC and children’s affec-
tive empathy processing. Here, less activation in the medial OFC is 
found for children who are more empathic. This rather paradoxical 
finding might indicate a shift of empathic processing away from 
anterior frontal regions in emphatic children, toward subcortical 
processing (as mirrored by the reported positive correlations in 
adult studies between empathic traits and anterior insula activa-
tion, e.g., Moriguchi et al., 2007; Silani et al., 2008, see Hein and 
Singer, 2008). However, this aspect remains speculative and should 
be investigated in future studies using fMRI.
With the present study, we introduce the method of fNIRS to 
the field of neurodevelopmental studies on empathy processing, 
and we believe it is a valuable tool for research in this field. fNIRS 
has several advantages over other imaging methods such as fMRI 
or PET, first of all, that no fixation of the head is needed. The child 
can sit on a comfortable chair in front of a screen, communicate 
with supervisor and parents during preparation and, if necessary, 
also during the trials. The optodes can easily be prepared before-
hand, thus the actual preparation is comfortable and not so time-
consuming. Because of its low constraints on the experimental 
environment, fNIRS is a good tool to investigate higher cognition, 
whereas an MRI environment may impair children’s concentration 
and speech perception (Hofmann et al., 2008). It has already been 
established as a method in studying neuropsychological develop-
ment in neonates and infants (Peña et al., 2003; Taga et al., 2004; 
Wartenburger et al., 2007). Additionally, fNIRS might be less prone 
than, e.g., fMRI to artifacts caused by the proximity to the air-filled 
sinuses of the OFC, when measuring OFC activations (Kringelbach, 
2005). However, fNIRS cannot supply the spatial resolution of 
fMRI-based approaches (Hofmann et al., 2008).
There are some limitations to our study. Both limitations are 
based on the fact that we employed a design that was applicable to 
young children, having in mind not to overtax the children. First 
of all, the application of a passive following paradigm in children 
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  Lisa und Tom spielen zusammen auf dem Spielplatz und ihre 
Mutter schaut von einer Bank aus zu.
  Tom steht vor der Rutsche, die Lisa gerade heruntergerutscht 
kommt.
Lisa rutscht Tom in den Rücken, beide fallen hin und weinen.
Die Mutter steht von der Bank auf und geht davon.
  Lisa and Tom are playing together on the playground, their 
mother watches them from a bench.
Tom is standing in front of the slide, which Lisa is just sliding down.
  Lisa slides into Tom’s back, both of them fall down and start crying.
Their mother gets up from the bench and walks away.
Cognitive empathy logical
Anna läuft zu einem Apfelbaum an dem viele Äpfel hängen
Sie möchte einen Apfel pflücken aber kommt nicht dran
Sie holt sich eine Kiste und schiebt sie unter den Baum
Sie stellt sich auf die Kiste und pflückt einen Apfel
Anna walks towards an apple-tree full of apples.
She wants to pick an apple, but cannot reach any.
She fetches a box and puts it under the tree (gets places).
She steps up on the box and picks an apple
Cognitive empathy unlogical
  Jannis entdeckt im obersten Fach des Schranks seiner Eltern 
ein Geschenk.
  Nach einigem Überlegen geht ihm ein Licht auf, wie er wie er 
daran kommen könnte.
Er holt sich eine lange Leiter.
  Jannis legt die Leiter auf den Boden und beginnt auf ihr zu 
balancieren
Jannis discovers a present in the top shelf of his parents’ closet.
After thinking a while, he gets an idea how to get it.
He fetches a long ladder.
Jannis puts the ladder on the ground and starts to walk on it.
Neutral with one person
Olli sieht eine Schaukel an einem Baum hängen
Er zieht die Schaukel zu sich
  Er klettert auf den untersten Ast, damit er richtig Schwung holen kann
Mit Schwung fängt er an zu schaukeln
Olli sees a swing hanging on a tree.
He pulls the swing towards himself.
He climbs onto the lowest branch, to get a good start.
He begins to swing.
Neutral with two persons
Der Vater zieht Jan auf dem Schlitten den Berg hinauf.
Die beide kommen oben an. 
Der Vater setzt sich zu Jan auf den Schlitten.
Sie rodeln gemeinsam den Berg hinunter.
The father pulls Jan on the sleigh up the hill.
They arrive at the top of the mountain.
The father sits down on the sleigh with Jan.
They sled down the mountain together.
appendIx
vIsual stIMulI
Affective empathy negative
Affective empathy positive
Cognitive empathy logical
Cognitive empathy non-logical
Neutral story with one person
Neutral story with two persons
wrItten versIons for the audItory storIes, read and 
recorded by an actress, gerMan orIgInal and englIsh 
translatIon
Affective empathy positive
Tim steht vor einer Bude und schleckt sein Eis.
Ein Mann kommt den Weg entlang gelaufen.
  Er übersieht den Jungen und rempelt ihn so an, dass Tim das 
Eis aus der Hand fällt.
Der Mann schenkt Tim ein neues Eis.
  Tim is standing in front of an ice-cream booth and licks his 
ice-cream 
A man comes walking along.
  He overlooks the boy and bumps into him, so that the ice-cream 
falls down from Tim’s hand.
The man buys a new ice-cream for Tim.
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